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Publicity and the Rule of Law* 
 Bruno Celano 
 1. Introduction 
 By the ‘Rule of Law’ I mean, as has now become usual among legal 
theorists, a set of formal and institutional features the law may possess 
in varying degrees (see  section  II ). Th ese features defi ne an ideal, which 
laws have traditionally been expected to live up to. 
 One of these features is  publicity . Part of what constitutes the Rule of 
Law is the requirement that the laws should be public. Th is is the subject 
of this chapter. When it is claimed that the Rule of Law requires that the 
laws should be public, what is to be understood by this claim? How is 
the relevant notion of publicity to be defi ned? 
 Th e question itself raises some puzzlement. What kind of question is 
it? I try to handle this problem in  section  2 . Answering our main ques-
tion requires, as we shall see, an understanding of the point, or points, 
of the publicity requirement, and of the Rule of Law generally. Sections 
3 and 4 will be devoted to a fi rst approximation to an answer to our 
main question. In  sections  5 and  6 I will propose an amendment to this 
answer, leading (or so I hope) to a richer understanding of the point of 
publicity. Answering the question will also require ( sections  7 and  8 ) 
focusing our attention on a particular version of the Rule of Law—I 
shall call it the ‘Enlightenment Rule of Law’—in which legislation plays 
a prominent role.  Section  9 will raise a further diffi  culty, leading to a 
fi nal amendment of our proposed defi nition of publicity. 
 * I am grateful for helpful comments and criticism to J. Queralt, G. Maniaci, J. J. Moreso, 
G. Pino, F. Poggi, A. Schiavello, and A. Spena, as well as to L. Green, B. Leiter, and an anony-
mous reader for OUP. An earlier version of this essay was delivered at DI.GI.TA., University 
of Genoa. I am grateful to the audience there, and especially to M. Barberis, P. Chiassoni, 
P. Comanducci, R. Guastini, M. La Torre, R. Marra, and C. Redondo. 
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 My main claim is that the Rule of Law requirement of publicity is best 
understood in terms of the notion of common, or mutual, knowledge. 
When it is required that the laws should be public, what should be meant 
by this is not only that each one of the law’s addressees should know what 
the law is, but also that everybody should know that everybody knows 
what the law is, that everybody should know that everybody knows that 
everybody knows what the law is, and so on. Th is may look unnecessarily 
complicated. I’ll try to show that this is a false impression, and that under-
standing the publicity requirement along these lines illuminates various 
aspects of the normative ideal that the publicity requirement may be taken 
to embody. Th ink of a regime in which laws are made known to their 
addressees by sending each one of them sealed envelopes. Everybody 
knows what the law is. But, would the Rule of Law requirement of public-
ity be met? I think many would be inclined to answer in the negative. 
Why? What is implied in our inclination to answer in this way? 
 2. Understanding the question 
 Th ere are many diff erent ways of understanding the phrase ‘the Rule of 
Law’. Here I adopt the one which has become common in contempo-
rary jurisprudence in the last forty years or so: 1 by ‘the Rule of Law’ 
(RoL, for short) I mean a loose cluster of (1) formal features of the laws 
(prospectivity, publicity, relative generality, relative stability, intelligibil-
ity and relative clarity, practicability, 2 consistency), plus (2) institutional 
and procedural desiderata (such as, for instance, that the making of par-
ticular norms, providing for individual cases, be guided by general rules; 
and, further, so-called principles of ‘natural justice’: that the resolution 
of disputes be entrusted to somebody not having an interest at stake in 
the judgment, and not being otherwise biased; the principle  audi alteram 
partem: and so on). 3 Items on the list partly vary according to the 
accounts given by diff erent authors. Th e core, however, is stable. 
 1 Accounts in this family have the form of “a sort of laundry list of features that a healthy 
legal system should have. Th ese are mostly variations of the eight desiderata of Lon Fuller’s 
‘internal morality of law’ ” ( Waldron  2002 , 154). 
 2 i.e. conformity to the principle  ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ . 
 3 For a list of these institutional and procedural requirements, see, e.g.,  Raz  1977 , 215–18. 
On principles of natural justice  cf. Hart  1961 , 156, 202. For similar lists of the RoL require-
ments see  Fuller  1969 , ch. 2,  Finnis  1980 , 270–1;  Marmor  2004 , 5 ff .;  Kramer  2007 , ch. 2. 
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 Before we venture any answer to the question of how to understand 
publicity, let us ask what sort of question this is. One could say that 
what the question calls for is stipulation; or, alternatively, an historical 
inquiry into what diff erent theorists—as well as lawyers generally, and, 
perhaps, the public at large—mean when they claim that laws should be 
public. Th e question could, no doubt, be understood in these ways. 
However, I’ll follow a diff erent tack. 
 RoL features defi ne an ethico-political ideal which laws are usually 
expected to live up to. In order to determine how each one of its features 
is to be understood, we have to gain some understanding of this ideal 
and to unravel its various aspects. We have to understand, that is, what 
the point, or points, of the RoL are, so as to determine what its various 
requirements should properly be taken to mean. At the same time, we 
could not gain any understanding, however rough, of the ideal without 
a preliminary understanding of the various requirements it encompasses. 
One step ahead on one count (what is the point of the Rule of Law?) is 
supposed to enable further steps on the other (how is this Rule of Law 
requirement to be understood?), and vice versa. Th e circle is supposed to 
be a virtuous one. But we have to jump in somewhere. 
 Th is is a normative, substantive ethico-political inquiry. 4 When I ask 
what is the best way of defi ning the RoL requirement of publicity, it is 
in this sense that the word ‘best’ has to be understood. 
 3. The instrumental value of publicity 
 What then is valuable in publicity, from the perspective of the RoL ideal? 
A fi rst answer to this question is quite simple. 5 Given what the point of 
 4 Such an inquiry is not unrelated to the two alternatives I mentioned two paragraphs 
above. Th e outcomes of a substantive normative inquiry of the kind described can only be 
deemed plausible to the extent that they on the whole agree with the  endoxa (i.e. the opinions 
held by all, or by those who are competent enough, or by the main authors) in the relevant 
fi eld; and they must be capable of being upheld as resting on—or leading to—plausible redefi -
nitions of the relevant concepts, given their current usage (mere stipulation is, of course, a 
diff erent matter). Th us, the two alternatives mentioned (stipulation, understood as plausible 
redefi nition of ordinarily used concepts, and critical understanding of what others have said) 
work as—partially defeasible—constraints on our inquiry. 
 5 Th e arguments I shall put forward are not meant to show that publicity is always, under 
any circumstances, required, or desirable. Th ey only provide  pro tanto reasons in its support (cf. 
for an inventory of “the forms of legal secrecy” in the modern state  Kutz  2009 , 203–9). Besides, 
publicity is discussed, in this chapter, as part of the RoL. Th e RoL itself is one ethico-political 
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the RoL is, the value of publicity is instrumental. For the laws to achieve 
the end the RoL assigns them, they have to be public. Let us see why. 
 What is the point of the RoL? A fi rst, rough answer to this question 
is close at hand. What the RoL says is, fi rst of all, that the laws should 
be such that they can be followed and obeyed. 
 Most of the RoL features specify, more or less directly, what is instru-
mentally required in order to achieve an end—namely, the end of guid-
ing human behaviour through rules. 6 Th us, many of them are features 
the laws must possess if they have to be capable of being followed and 
obeyed. So understood, the features constituting the RoL are features an 
instrument (laws) must possess in order to perform its function (guiding 
human behaviour), and to perform it well. In this way, the RoL require-
ments are to law what sharpness is to a knife ( Raz  1977 , 225). 
 To illustrate: if they are to be able to guide human behaviour laws 
have to be laid out in advance (prospectivity), and to be clear enough for 
their addressees to understand them (intelligibility). Th e same line of 
reasoning obviously holds for publicity: if they are to be capable of guid-
ing human behaviour, laws have to be public. 7 
 Th is gives us a fi rst, obvious (though by no means unimportant) 
determination of what ‘public’ should be understood to mean here. If 
they are to be capable of guiding human behaviour, laws have to be 
 made known to their addressees. 8 
 4. Publicity and human dignity 
 Th ere is, however, more to publicity—understood as the laws’ being 
made known to their addressees—than its instrumental value. 9 
ideal among many other commendable ideals; it should not be taken as setting requirements 
that always, under any circumstances, override any other ethico-political consideration. 
 6 In  Fuller’s ( 1969 , 106) phrase, “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the govern-
ance of rules.”  Cf. Raz  1977 , 214. 
 7 Th is is the main  rationale for viewing publication as a necessary condition for enacted laws 
to acquire full legal validity ( cf. Guastini  2010 , 77–8). 
 8 Th is holds only for what may be called ‘normal’, or standard, guidance—i.e. guidance 
through an understanding, by the agent, of what the law, according to its tenor, requires of him, 
and that it is required of him (Celano 2013b). All sorts of non-standard cases can be devised (e.g. 
parents may sometimes, in order to make their children do A, tell them not to do A, thus relying 
on their children’s standing disposition to do the opposite of what they tell them to do). 
 9 Th ere is one aspect of the value of publicity which I take to be unproblematic, and with 
which I shall not be concerned here. Publicity is a necessary condition for accountability. One 
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 Th is requirement of publicity also embodies a basic insight about 
justice: it is unjust that an agent should be judged blameworthy, and 
punished, for having acted against a standard of conduct—or norm 
(I shall use these terms interchangeably)—that was unknown to 
them. 10 Call this moral principle the  ignorantia legis excusat (ILE) 
principle. 
 Th e status of the ILE principle is precarious. Th ere may perhaps be 
good reasons (which I shall not explore here) for holding people morally 
blameworthy for violations of moral standards they have no knowledge 
of. Likewise, there may be good reasons (pragmatic or otherwise) 
grounding, in the legal domain (specifi cally, in the fi eld of criminal law), 
the principle  ignorantia legis non excusat . Th e moral ILE principle, how-
ever, expresses, I think, a sound default position: barring special consid-
erations,  ceteris paribus , etc., it would be unjust to judge an agent 
blameworthy, and to punish them, for having violated a norm, or nor-
mative requirement, of which they have, and had, no knowledge. 11 
Quite sensibly, we may wish to amend, and weaken, the principle in 
order to take account of the hypothesis of faulty ignorance:  ceteris pari-
bus , it is unjust to judge an agent blameworthy, and to punish them, for 
having violated a norm, or normative requirement, they did not know, 
and were faultlessly not in a position to gain knowledge of (reasonable 
ignorance). By so weakening the principle we impose on agents the bur-
den of doing their best in order to ascertain what the standards their 
behaviour is subject to are (thereby licensing a defeasible presumption: 
absent special evidence, the agent is supposed to know what the relevant 
norms are). 
way in which the RoL “restricts the discretion of government offi  cials, reducing wilfulness and 
arbitrariness,” argues B.  Tamanaha ( 2009 , 7, 8), is “by insisting that government offi  cials act 
pursuant to and consistent with applicable legal rules”; one way in which the law operates to 
obtain this benefi t is this: “legal rules provide publicly available requirements and standards 
that can be used to hold government offi  cials accountable during and after their actions” (this, 
I take it, includes judicial decisions). Th e case for publicity is even stronger, of course. when 
one looks to  democratic accountability ( Kutz  2009 , 200). 
 10 Cf. for a vivid illustration of this point F. Kafka’s  In der Strafkolonie (1919). 
 11 Th e point is that ignorance is an  excuse (and, thus, it prevents blameworthiness), although 
the act is, in fact, wrong (cf., on the legal count,  Husak  1994 , 109, 114). Th e principle obvi-
ously allows for cases in which, to use  B. Williams’s phrase ( 1989 , 43), “it will be merely 
unclear what, if anything, blame [blame “in a focussed form, as opposed to its acting as a 
broader instrument of correction and disapproval”] is eff ecting” (cases in which it may be an 
“unintelligible mystery” what blame is up to;  Williams  1989 , 44). 
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 Th ese considerations are especially important in providing moral 
grounds for the legal principle  ignorantia legis non excusat. 12 In the light 
of these considerations, in fact, the legal principle may itself come to be 
understood as a corollary of the principle of publicity: where the laws 
are made accessible to their addressees,  ignorantia legis may (defeasibly) 
be presumed to be blameworthy. 13 
 Our weakened ILE principle, it seems, neatly applies to publicity: 
 ceteris paribus , it is unjust to judge an agent blameworthy, and to punish 
them, for having violated a norm that has not been made known to 
them. Th is only works, however, under a  proviso . Th e  proviso is that the 
relevant standard, or norm, be of a certain kind: it must be a norm that 
an agent can gain no knowledge of unless it is made known to them—
i.e. a norm with which an agent cannot become acquainted unless it is 
somehow communicated to them. 14 
 Standards of conduct that exist only if someone, individual or body, 
has laid them down, or more generally that exist only as the upshot of 
contingent human action or behaviour, I shall call ‘positive’. Positive 
standards of conduct (including positive law) fi t the relevant condi-
tion: agents whose behaviour is subject to positive norms could gain 
no access to such norms unless they are somehow made known or 
communicated to them. In their case, then, the  proviso is satisfi ed. 
Where positive norms are concerned, it would be unjust,  ceteris pari-
bus , to hold an individual blameworthy, and to punish them, for 
 having violated a norm that was not made known to them, i.e. was not 
public. Th is is what the RoL requirement of publicity expresses. 
 Correspondingly, we can posit a (moral) right, held by individuals 
 12 On reasonable mistake as a legal excuse,  cf. Husak and von Hirsch  1993 , 166–70. 
 13 So that, conversely, ignorance due to failure of publicity exonerates ( Husak and von 
Hirsch  1993 , 166, 173). Cf. also  Husak  1994 , 115: “good citizens make an eff ort to learn the 
law of the state. But duties inhere in both directions. Good states make an eff ort to teach citi-
zens the law.” Th e presumption, and the corresponding burden, may appear especially plausi-
ble in the case of (1) power-conferring rules, specifying the procedure and formalities to be 
respected in order, e.g. to write a valid will; and (2) rules which apply to “people who occupy 
very specifi c roles” ( cf. Goodin  2010 , 620–1). 
 14 Th is may suggest the idea ( Goodin  2010 ) that, in order to avoid the ILE stricture, it is 
desirable that the law—in its duty-imposing aspect (not relating to special roles or activities)—
should closely track (and be known to do so) morality, on the (both unrealistic and theoreti-
cally problematic, I think) assumption that, on the whole, the dictates of the latter are known 
to everybody, or at least can be easily worked out by everybody. I shall not discuss this proposal 
here. 
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subject to a given jurisdiction, that (positive) norms in that jurisdic-
tion be at least made known to them. Th is is not the much stronger 
requirement that norms to which individuals are subject should be 
justifi able to them, so that they can understand and endorse the rea-
sons supporting them. 15 It is the far more modest requirement that it 
should be somehow communicated to them that they are supposed to 
act in this or that way. 
 If we now ask  why it would be unjust,  ceteris paribus , to judge an 
individual blameworthy, and to punish them, for having violated a posi-
tive standard not made known to them, we fi nd it hard to give a further 
answer. We seem to have reached moral bedrock. We could say, however, 
more or less circularly, that violations of the principle would be viola-
tions of human dignity: they would show lack of respect for human 
beings as responsible, autonomous agents. Th e argument might go like 
this. 
 Respect for human beings as responsible, autonomous agents entails 
taking due account of their capacity for making informed choices: 
leaving room for their capacity to be, in Raz’s phrase, (part) authors of 
their own lives ( Raz  1986 , 369). Judging an individual blameworthy, 
and punishing them, for having violated a positive standard not made 
known to them contradicts this attitude—no choice was left to them. 
Th is is why it expresses disrespect for human dignity ( cf. Kramer  2007 , 
151). 
 J. Raz has claimed that “observance of the rule of law is necessary if 
the law is to respect human dignity” ( Raz  1977 , 221). “Respecting 
human dignity,” he argues, “entails treating humans as persons capable 
of planning and plotting their future. Th us, respecting people’s dignity 
entails respecting their autonomy, their right to control their future” 
( Raz  1977 , 221). Th e main way in which disregard for the RoL “violates 
human dignity” is by allowing the frustration of expectations the law 
itself has encouraged (this is, says Raz, often “analogous to entrapment”; 
 Raz  1977 , 222). 
 Th e argument for publicity (as presently understood) sketched two 
paragraphs above illustrates this. Punishing an individual for having 
 15 According to J.  Waldron ( 1987 ), a similar requirement, concerning the principles of 
government, is the fundamental ethico-political requirement at the heart of modern 
liberalism. 
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violated a positive standard not made known to them is also a sort of 
entrapment, showing disrespect for their status as a responsible, 
autonomous agents. Th ere is something deeply misconceived in 
putting the blame on such an agent for having acted against a norm 
of conduct unknown to them (provided always that they are not at 
fault for their ignorance—see above). Being exposed to the possibility 
of such punishments generates serious uncertainty, restricting the 
agent’s opportunities for making informed choices and planning their 
future—as typically do, according to  Raz ( 1977 , 222), violations of 
the RoL. Th us, the RoL requirement of publicity, so understood, 
neatly fi ts the picture of the RoL as a shield against (certain forms of ) 
disrespect for human dignity. 16 
 5. Publicity as common knowledge 
 So far, the law’s being public has been understood in a way compatible 
with the (unrealistic) hypothesis of laws that are communicated to their 
addressees by way of sending each one of them sealed envelopes ( section 
 1 ). But this, I argue, is too narrow an understanding of the concept of 
publicity. We have to enrich the set of those to whom the relevant stand-
ards should be made known, by giving it a special structure. Th e relevant 
standards are to be understood as being made known neither  to one 
person at a time , nor to a plurality of persons  independently of each other , 
though simultaneously. Th ey are to be made a matter of  common , or 
mutual, knowledge.
 I defi ne the notion of common knowledge thus: 
 It is common knowledge among A and B that p if and only if 
 (1) A knows that p; 
 (1’) B knows that p; 
 (2) A knows that B knows that p; 
 (2’) B knows that A knows that p; 
 and so on,  ad infi nitum . 
 16 Th at the point of (many of ) the RoL requirements is to warrant,  inter alia , (certain forms 
of ) respect for human beings as responsible agents, entitled to make autonomous choices, is 
common ground.  Cf. Fuller  1969 , 162–3;  Finnis  1980 , 272–3;  MacCormick  1985 , 26;  Mar-
mor  2004 , 21, 32;  Kramer  2007 , 162, 171, 176;  Waldron  2008 , 76. 
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 Or, in other words
 p is common knowledge among the members of group G if and only if 
each one of the members of G 
 (1) knows that p; 
 (2) knows that each one of the members of G knows that p; 
 (3)  knows that each one of the members of G knows that each one of the 
members of G knows that p; 
 and so on,  ad infi nitum. 17 
 17 On the notions of common, or mutual, knowledge see respectively  Lewis  1969 , 52 ff .; 
 Schiff er  1972 , 30 ff . (diff erences between the two notions need not detain us here). Th e con-
nection between common knowledge and publicity is no surprise. In fact, the notion of 
common knowledge is supposed to capture “the idea that some fact is ‘out in the open’ or 
‘entirely public’ with respect to certain individuals” ( Gilbert  1987 , 188; cf. also  Chwe  2001 , 
13). A number of caveats are in place here. (1) In the text common knowledge is defi ned in 
terms of a hierarchy of epistemic iterations. Th is is the simplest and intuitive way of intro-
ducing the phenomenon; the defi nitions provided by the main authors usually have, how-
ever, a diff erent structure—such that they entail, or otherwise generate, epistemic iterations 
of the kind indicated. (2) Its being common knowledge that p requires, apparently, an infi -
nite set of epistemic states, or unbounded computational capacities, by the relevant indi-
viduals; and, it is argued, since human cognitive capacities are limited, common knowledge 
is impossible. Th is objection can be met (various strategies have been proposed; cf. Vander-
schraaf and Sillari 2007, sections 2.2, 2.5, 4). But, even if it can be, (3) it remains true that 
“it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society” 
( Binmore  2008 , 17, 23). I assume that some suitable notion of  approximate common knowl-
edge , or “ordinary common knowledge” ( Paternotte  2010 ), can be built, by weakening some 
of the conditions for common knowledge proper, thus overcoming this and similar objec-
tions. (4) Here, and in the next section, common knowledge is presented as a necessary 
condition (for the law to be effi  cacious in its intended way, here; for it to respect human 
dignity, in the next section). Strictly speaking, I do not show this (specifi cally, I do not 
demonstrate that the series of higher-level epistemic iterations is bound to be closed, in 
whatever way it is supposed to be closed when common knowledge proper obtains). I show, 
rather, that common knowledge proper, or some suitable form of approximate common 
knowledge, is a necessary condition for those feats to be achieved. (5) Highly sophisticated 
formal defi nitions of the concept of common knowledge (and of approximate common 
knowledge) have been worked out (cf. for a survey Vanderschraaf and Sillari 2007,  section 
 2 ). An assessment of these proposals is both beyond my competence and unnecessary here. 
For our purposes, an intuitive grasp of the phenomenon is all that is needed. It is an 
undoubtedly real phenomenon ( cf. Chwe  2001 , 77–9), which the defi nition given in the 
text, though informal and imprecise, vividly depicts. (6) I talk, following the tradition, of 
common  knowledge ; the distinction between knowledge and belief is, however, of obvious 
importance in this context. Under this respect, too, I leave matters undetermined, relying on 
entrenched ways of characterizing the phenomenon. It should be stressed, however, that 
common ‘knowledge’ is usually the upshot of guesswork by the individuals involved, and a 
defeasible achievement. 
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 Th e best way of understanding the RoL requirement of publicity is in 
terms of such common knowledge. 18 Th ere are three reasons for this. 
Th e fi rst concerns the effi  cacy of the law, and will be discussed in the 
present section. Th e second and the third will be discussed, respectively, 
in  sections  6 and  7 . A fourth reason for requiring that the laws should 
be commonly known among their subjects goes beyond the RoL ideal, 
and involves further ethico-political assumptions ( section  8 ). 
 Let us return to our understanding of publicity as instrumentally 
valuable—indeed, necessary—in order for the laws to achieve their 
intended (normal) purpose ( section  3 ). If laws are to provide guidance 
for human behaviour, as we have seen, they have to be made known to 
their addressees. But effi  cacy also requires mutual knowledge, in two 
ways. 
 First, as noted by H. H. Clark and T. B. Carlson (1982), when what 
is required is a “joint act,” shared beliefs  among the addressees is crucial. 
By a ‘joint act’ is meant “an act by two or more people who must, in 
general, intentionally co-ordinate their separate actions in order to suc-
ceed” ( Clark and Carlson  1982 , 2). 19 When for example, X tells A and 
B to shake hands “for [X] to expect [A and B] to be able to carry it out, 
he must intend each of them to recognize not only what he asked of  him 
but also what he has asked of the other. If they are told separately and 
have no guarantee the other has been told, they should realize they can-
not carry out that joint act without further negotiation” (Clark and 
Carlson, 1–2; cf. also  Chwe  2001 , 9, 111). 
 Th e law may enjoin a plurality of addressees to perform joint acts. 
Th ink, for example, of regulations that assign tasks to collegial bodies, 
or set up the provision of public services. In such cases, it will not be 
enough that the relevant directive be made known to each of the address-
ees separately (as with the sealed envelopes). It will also be necessary, if 
the directive is to guide behaviour in the intended (standard) way, that 
 18 For a suggestion in this sense (regarding public policies),  cf. Luban  1996 , 170. According 
to  Rawls ( 1971 , 48), it is a “reasonable simplifying assumption” (for the purposes of a theory 
of justice) to see publicity as common knowledge as a defi ning property of the rules constitut-
ing an institution; accordingly, the law is characterized as a system of “public rules” ( Rawls 
 1971 , 207; Rawls, however, does not use the phrase ‘common knowledge’). 
 19 Examples include “shaking hands . . ., rowing a boat, speaking and listening, driving 
down a highway, signalling in Morse code, walking in a crowd of people, meeting, and danc-
ing” ( Clark and Carlson  1982 , 2). 
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it becomes common knowledge among them. In such cases, then, what 
the RoL requires, by way of publicity (making positive laws known to 
their addressees), is common knowledge. 20 
 But, second, this turns out to be true of a huge number of legal 
requirements, 21 including cases of actions each one of us can perform on 
our own (not involving coordination in the above sense), under a certain 
plausible condition. 
 Consider a group of individuals G, all addressees of a positive require-
ment R, such that, for each member of G, part of the reason for comply-
ing with R is the expectation that the other members of G will comply 
(because they have this expectation, because they expect the others to 
have this expectation, and so on). Everybody is expected to comply 
because,  inter alia , each expects the others (to expect the others . . .) to 
comply; everybody complies, in part, because each has this set of expec-
tations about the others’ expectations and conduct. 
 Th e condition under which our fi nding turns out to be true of many 
positive laws is that, where a legal system exists (which requires its being 
generally effi  cacious), the population of its addressees is, to a varying 
extent, a group of the kind described. Th is may be understood in two 
ways. 
 First, it may be a matter of the actual subjective motivations of the 
addressees. Where (nearly) all (nearly) always comply because ( inter 
alia ) they are disposed to comply on condition that they expect the oth-
ers to comply, and they in fact expect the others to comply because they 
expect them to expect the others to comply (and so on), the laws cannot 
guide behaviour (in the standard way) unless they are matters of com-
mon knowledge. 22 
 It may also be understood, second, as a matter concerning what 
(objectively) good reasons each addressee has for complying. Many legal 
requirements are such that it would make no sense to comply with them 
 20 A special case is when the law enjoins the performance of a set of actions providing the 
solution of a coordination problem in the strict, game-theoretical sense. In order to work, in 
this way, as solutions to coordination problems laws have to be common knowledge among 
their subjects (cf. generally  Lewis  1969 ). In such cases the law works as a mere indicator. Once 
one of the many equilibria available is made salient to the parties by being singled out by the 
law, all individuals involved will, by hypothesis, do their part in it ( cf. Ullmann-Margalit  1981 ; 
 Green  1988 , 111–15). 
 21 Bentham’s idea ( cf. Postema  1986 , 246). 
 22 Remember, here and in what follows, caveat (4) in  n.  17 . 
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unless one expected most of the others to comply as well. Examples 
range, it may be argued, from complying with many traffi  c regulations 
to paying taxes or, on some accounts, keeping one’s word. It is, in gen-
eral, the case with legal directives that can plausibly be explained as 
attempted solutions to multilateral Prisoner’s Dilemmas and similar 
sorts of collective action problems. In such cases, it is necessary for the 
addressees to have reason to comply that it is common knowledge 
among them what the requirements imposed by the laws are. In this 
interpretation, then, what the RoL requirement of publicity expresses is 
the idea that, in order for the laws to provide good reasons for action to 
their subjects, they should be common knowledge among them. 
 6. Common knowledge as a precondition for certainty 
 Once again, however, the common knowledge requirement is not merely 
a matter of the law’s being effi  cacious. Here too publicity is a matter of 
respecting human dignity. 
 Why? Because in order for each individual to enjoy—or to have the 
opportunity of enjoying—his status as a responsible, autonomous agent, 
it is not enough that the way the legal system will react to his actions be 
predictable to him (on the basis of his own knowledge of the laws). It is 
also necessary that he is in a position to predict, with reasonable confi -
dence, how it will react to  the other citizens’ behaviour. It is necessary, 
generally, that he be able to form reasonable expectations about how the 
others will act in response to the existing legal standards; and, once 
again, how they act will depend in part on how they expect the legal 
system to react to their behaviour, and that of others. Th us, in order for 
the laws to make room for their subjects’ autonomy it is necessary for 
them to be common knowledge. 
 Observance of the RoL is necessary if the law is to respect human 
dignity, because laws meeting RoL conditions will guarantee a meas-
ure of certainty in the relations between the law and its subjects (thus 
making room for their autonomous choices) and do not act as ‘entrap-
ment’ devices ( section  4 ). Th is applies to individual citizens in their 
relation to the government. But it also applies to citizens in relation to 
each other; or, better, to each individual citizen’s relation to the gov-
ernment in relation to  the other citizens’ relation to the government. 
Certainty, and the avoidance of ‘entrapment’, will only be possible if 
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the laws work as commonly known social interaction devices that are 
a common focus for relatively stable mutual expectations. Only laws 
meeting the condition of publicity understood as common knowledge 
are apt to give rise to a stable, reliable set of concordant mutual expec-
tations at all levels, thus guaranteeing a measure of fi rmness and pre-
dictability in the interaction of rulers and ruled, and of law’s subjects 
with each other. 
 To sum up. Certainty of the relations between the law and its subjects 
requires that an individual can form reliable expectations about the 
behaviour of government’s offi  cials and of the other citizens (and of gov-
ernment’s offi  cials in relation to other citizens, and vice versa), in respect 
of existing legal standards; this holds for all alike (and each is aware of 
this . . .). It is only by being public in the deeper sense of being a matter 
of common knowledge that law contributes to the establishment, among 
its subjects, of a system of relatively stable and relatively reliable inter-
locking mutual expectations. And this is a necessary condition if the law 
is to show respect for the subjects’ ability to make meaningful autono-
mous choices. 
 7. The Rule of Law as the rule of legislation 
 Let us now ask ourselves what kind of norms are best able to satisfy the 
publicity condition in the sense of common knowledge. Th e answer is, 
it seems to me,  prescriptions. 23 
 Prescribing is, roughly, the purposive activity of trying to get people 
to do something by telling them to do it. Prescribing has several formal 
features. As with any other purposive, goal-oriented activity some of 
these express the requirements that the activity has to fulfi l in order to 
achieve its constitutive purpose. Some of these features instantiate ele-
ments of the RoL ideal. Th is is no surprise, of course, since, as I remarked 
in  section  3 , most of the RoL conditions follow from what is instru-
mentally required when we want to subject human behaviour to the 
 23 “Prescriptions are  given or  issued by someone. Th ey ‘fl ow’ from or have their ‘source’ 
in the will of a norm-giver . . . Th ey are, moreover, addressed at some agent or agents, whom 
we shall call norm- subject(s) ” ( von Wright  1963 , 7; further features which he sees as “char-
acteristic of norms which are prescriptions” ( von Wright  1963 , 7) are of no interest for us 
here). 
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guidance of rules; and prescribing just  is trying to subject human behav-
iour to the guidance of rules. 24 
 So, for instance, prescriptions typically have to be prospective and 
intelligible if they are to be capable of achieving their purpose of guiding 
human behaviour. Further, the activity of prescribing is subject to 
rational pressure in favour of conformity to the principles that  ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’ (practicability), and that confl icts are to be avoided 
(consistency). 25 
 A conceptual connection between the issuing of prescriptions and a 
constraint of common knowledge is not hard to fi nd. When prescrip-
tions are issued, what happens between lawgiver and addressee is out in 
the open among them. 26 A prescription is typically issued with a certain 
intention and its workings rest on a complex set of interrelated inten-
tions, and their successful expression and detection ( Grice  1957 ;  Straw-
son  1964 , 256–7;  Schiff er  1972 , 19;  Celano  1990 , 127–51, 205–13; cf. 
also  Raz  1996 , 283). Th e lawgiver normally has, fi rst, the intention to 
make the addressee perform a certain action; and, second, the intention 
to make the addressee perform a certain action as a consequence of his 
uttering a sentence. Th ird, he intends to make the addressee perform a 
certain action (as a consequence of his uttering a sentence) by virtue of 
the recognition, by the addressee, of these very same intentions. 
 In issuing a prescription, then, the lawgiver assumes his addressee to be 
capable of detecting—and of expressing her detection of—a complex set 
of nested intentions. Th e addressee is presumed to be capable of under-
standing: (1) that the speaker wants her to behave in a certain way; (2) 
that he wants to make her behave in the desired way; (3) that he wants to 
produce this outcome as a consequence of his uttering a sentence; (4) 
that he wants to produce this outcome by virtue of her recognition of 
these intentions, (1) to (4). It follows that for a prescription to aff ect its 
addressee’s conduct in the way it is intended to, it is necessary that the 
 24 Th is should be qualifi ed. Prescribing is not necessarily the issuing of  general directives, or 
of ‘rules’ proper. Under this respect the requirements of the RoL do not apply to prescribing as 
such. But we may abstract from this, and focus on the respects in which prescribing does 
indeed instantiate the kind of activity RoL requirements apply to. 
 25  Cf. Celano  2013b . Th ese are all features that prescriptions  typically exhibit, and pressures 
prescriptions are  standardly subject to. Th e possibility of non-standard prescriptions is not 
ruled out. Th ese will be cases of abuse of the institution of prescribing. 
 26 Cf. for a detailed treatment of this point  Celano  2013a ,  section  6 . 
136 Bruno Celano
addressee understand that her understanding of the prescription is itself 
a necessary condition for it to produce the desired outcome. A prescrip-
tion is a kind of tool that works (in the way it is intended to work) only 
if the object it causally aff ects understands that it is so working. It also 
follows that the operation of a prescription—Y’s conduct being guided 
by X’s uttering a sentence—is grounded on X’s anticipating Y’s practical 
reasoning, including Y’s representation in her practical reasoning of X’s 
practical reasoning, and of this very anticipation. 
 So, in order for the lawgiver to achieve his aim, it is necessary for him 
to make his intention of making the addressee perform a certain action 
through the utterance of a given sentence known to the addressee (this 
is our fi rst notion of publicity; see  section  3 ). Th is is not, however, suf-
fi cient. If odd or deviant ways of infl uencing others’ behaviour are to be 
ruled out ( Strawson  1964 , 256–7, 263;  Schiff er  1972 , 30), a condition 
of common knowledge also has to be satisfi ed. In prescribing, the law-
giver intends to make the addressee perform a given action by virtue of 
the recognition, by the addressee, of this very intention. Th us, an utter-
ance may count as a prescription only if the addressee believes that the 
lawgiver has the relevant intentional structure, if she believes the law-
giver to believe that she believes he has it, and so on. Likewise, it is 
necessary that the lawgiver believes that the addressee recognizes this 
structure, that he believes her to believe that he believes this, and so on. 
In short, a prescription only has been issued if it is common knowledge 
among lawgiver and addressee that it has been issued. 
 Let us return now to the law. What kind of legal standards most natu-
rally fi t this model? Th e answer may appear obvious: statutes—i.e. the 
upshots of legislative activity. (I do not mean to claim that statutes are 
the only kind of legal standards that may fi t this picture, but that they 
are the ones that most naturally come to mind and are good candidates.) 
At a fi rst glance legislation plainly  is the issuing of prescriptions. 27 So the 
kind of positive law the RoL requirement of publicity as common 
knowledge most naturally applies to is statutes, the product of legisla-
tion. Admittedly, prescriptions must be common knowledge  between 
lawgiver and addressee and the RoL requirement of publicity, as presently 
understood, requires that the laws be common knowledge (also) 
 among their addressees . Th is is a further step. But prescriptions (and thus, 
 27 But see the last paragraph of this section. 
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statutes), given the role common knowledge plays in their coming into 
existence and in their intended (normal) workings, will typically meet 
this further condition. Prescriptions are thus doubly public. Under 
normal conditions, prescribing is a procedure openly and publicly 
directed at the issuing of public directives. Where prescriptions are 
involved not only the standard itself, but also its mode of birth, are 
normally out in the open. As noted by J. Waldron, legislation is ‘trans-
parent’: the legislature “is an institution set up explicitly to make and 
change the law. . . . [L]aw-making in a legislature . . . is law-making 
through a procedure dedicated publicly and transparently to that task” 
( Waldron  2007 , 99). 28 
 So understood, legislation is a special kind of power. When the gov-
ernment exercises that power over its subjects, it addresses them as 
adults: it accords them the dignity of beings worthy of being publicly, 
openly addressed, and of being guided through their understanding of 
the way in which power is being exerted over them. In short, it treats 
them with and shows them  respect . 
 Th is way of exercising power over a human being is diff erent from the 
way in which people sometimes try to guide children’s behaviour—dis-
torting reality, or trying to manipulate, unknown to hem, the environ-
ment or their preferences, by working behind their back. Th ese, of 
course, are ways in which even adult men and women are often treated—
and sometimes wish to be treated (or have to be treated). But they are 
not respectful ways. 29 
 In short, then, to the extent that they are all addressed as the 
addressees of prescriptions, individuals are treated with  equal respect . 
Th is concerns, of course, only the form of the relationship, not the 
content of the prescription. It is compatible with all sorts of disre-
spect and unjust discrimination. 30 But it positively is, it seems to me, 
a further aspect involved in the point of the publicity (common 
knowledge) requirement. 
 All this gives a legislative twist to the RoL. Th e RoL has to be under-
stood—according to the understanding of the requirement of publicity 
 28 Cf. also  Waldron  1999b , 12; and 2009, 693. 
 29 Remember that we are dealing, here, with standard cases. Abuses are possible ( n.  25 ). 
 30 Orders may be harsh, brutal; they may be wielded as weapons by people intending only 
to make other people do certain things—or positively aiming at humiliating them. Prescrip-
tions, as discussed in the text, are an ideal communicative type. 
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we are now considering—as the rule of legislation. Th is is a specifi c ver-
sion of the ideal of the RoL, whose building blocks were laid down, 
roughly, in European legal culture in the 18th and 19th centuries. I shall 
call it ‘Enlightenment RoL’ (ERoL for short). ERoL gives pride of place, 
in the development and operation of law, to legislation. 31 
 Th is version of the RoL raises several problems. I simply note some of 
them here, deferring to another occasion any attempt at solving them.  
 (1)  Th e RoL is often depicted as a spontaneous, non-manufactured, 
unintended, gradually evolving order of human interaction whose 
administration and piecemeal development is entrusted to the col-
lective, ‘artifi cial’ reason of the judiciary. Obviously, ERoL does not 
fi t this picture. 
 (2)  Th e notion of a legislation-oriented RoL—ERoL—runs counter to 
the well-established contrast between ‘the Rule of Law’ and ‘the rule 
of men’. 32 
 (3)  Th e most serious problem is, I think, raised by the apparently obvi-
ous claim that legislation plainly is the issuing of prescriptions, that 
statutes are prescriptions. Legislation proper, as it occurs in devel-
oped legal systems, has many complex, articulated procedural and 
institutional features, which have no obvious equivalent in the case 
of simple acts of prescribing. Most important, there is no obvious 
way in which a multi-membered legislature, composed of individu-
als and groups who sharply disagree with each other on the relevant 
issues, and making decisions on the basis of majority rule, may be 
assimilated to an individual, enacting his own will by expressing it 
in the form of a prescription ( Waldron  1999a , part I;  1999b , 
26–8). 
 8. The Enlightenment project 
 Th ere is, then, a conceptual connection holding (via the centrality of 
legislation) between ERoL, on the one hand, and an understanding of 
 31 A commitment to ERoL is conceptually linked to the endorsement of normative legal 
positivism—the view that it is a good and desirable thing that the laws have easily identifi able, 
readily accessible, as far as possible non-controversial social sources ( Celano  2013a ). 
 32 Th is is noted in  Raz  1977 , 212, and explained in  Waldron  1999b , 24;  2007 , 101–4. For 
a discussion,  cf. Celano  2013a ,  section  5 . 
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publicity as common knowledge, on the other hand. Th is connection 
points to a further reason—a fourth reason ( section  5 )—for understand-
ing the RoL (specifi cally, ERoL) requirement of publicity as a require-
ment of common knowledge. It rests on some aspects of what I shall 
rather loosely call, with no pretentions of historical exactness, ‘the 
Enlightenment project’. Th e endorsement of ERoL is one of its main 
components; some of its further facets will emerge in what follows. Th e 
connection between the Enlightenment project and publicity as com-
mon knowledge goes beyond the ideal of the RoL (and ERoL), as here 
understood. It comes into light when ERoL is seen as an element in the 
Enlightenment project. 
 Th e Enlightenment project, as I understand it, involves a set of sub-
stantive ethico-political assumptions concerning the status and the 
rights of citizens of a republican political community. Th ey can be best 
spelt out in broadly Kantian terms. I list those that are relevant to our 
inquiry: members in a just political community are free and equal; as 
autonomous agents, they are entitled to being subject to laws that they 
at least understand and recognize as such, and they have a right to criti-
cize freely these laws. I am not going to defend these views here. In this 
section, the RoL publicity requirement will be worked out within the 
framework of these assumptions. I argue that, in this framework too, 
publicity is best understood as common knowledge. 
 It is part and parcel of the Enlightenment project that positive laws 
should be fully accessible to all. Th is requires that their existence be 
ascertainable by each of their addressees (this is, as we shall see in a 
moment— section  9 —the off spring of publicity in our fi rst sense). It 
also requires that they be intelligible to common human understanding. 
Th e laws must not be the jealous possession of (in Bentham’s phrase) 
“Judge & Co,” purportedly requiring, for their knowledge and under-
standing, a special, ‘artifi cial’ reason, which is somehow beyond the 
capacities of all cognitively normal adult human beings. Lawyers should 
not function as priests having unique access to the sacred books. 
 But the Enlightenment project also requires that the law should be 
public in a further, stronger sense. Th e laws must be such that they can 
be the subject of public discussion, and the object of open criticism. 
Th ey are meant to constrain the actions and interactions of free and 
equals; and only laws that can be openly discussed and criticized are 
compatible with the status of individuals as free and equal. 
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 Th is, once again, requires that the laws should be not merely known 
to each addressee, but also common knowledge among them. In one 
sense, this is a trivial point. Only standards of conduct commonly 
known can be the object of public critical debate. 33 But why, one may 
wonder, are only laws that are public, in this way, fi t for free and 
equals? 
 Part of the answer follows from what I have said already about com-
mon knowledge as a condition for the law’s respecting the dignity of 
responsible, autonomous agents. In order for each individual to enjoy 
that status it is necessary that the laws may become the common focus 
for relatively stable mutual expectations ( section  6 ). Government by 
prescriptions (and thus by legislation) shows respect for its subjects ( sec-
tion  7 ). Moreover—and this is the present point—autonomous indi-
viduals have, as such, a right to openly criticize any claim, doctrine, 
theory or institution (especially so, when it purports to guide them, and 
it claims the authority for doing so), including, of course, their own 
views, laying down their criticism under the eyes of the public at large—
that is, in the public sphere ( Kant  1781 , AXI, A738-9/B766-7;  Kant 
 1784 ). And only laws that are public—i.e. commonly known—can be 
so criticized (non-public laws would  eo ipso lose their status in the 
process). 
 Th e point can be elaborated. Th e Enlightenment project includes a 
commitment against secrecy of laws, and of governmental action, as a 
general principle (Bobbio 1980, 94;  Luban  1996 , 154–7). It includes, 
for example. a rejection of the Platonic Noble Lie (Plato,  Resp. 414b–c), 
 arcana imperii . or ‘Government House utilitarianism’. 34 Why? Because 
free individuals are subject to public laws: their being subject to the 
constraint of a law is only compatible with their autonomy if they openly 
and frankly acknowledge it, under everybody else’s eyes. 35 It must be out 
in the open that something is required, as must what is required, and 
 33 On publicity as a condition for the “public scrutiny” of the laws,  cf. Kramer  2007 , 151–2 
(but cf. also  Fuller  1969 , 51). 
 34 Th is is part of what J.  Waldron ( 2009 , 693;  see also  2001 , 418), following Rawls, calls 
“the liberal principle of publicity”: “the idea that the legitimacy of our institutions should not 
depend upon any widespread public misapprehension about the way they operate.” 
 35 According to  Waldron ( 2009 , 693, “transparency” (i.e. conformity to the principle of 
publicity; see this chapter,  n.  34 ) “conveys the idea that the law in some sense  belongs to the 
members of the public. It is  their law.” 
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what is supposed to follow as a consequence of behaviour not conform-
ing to the requirement. Free people do not hide their subjection. Th eir 
right to criticize freely presupposes this openness of acknowledgment. 
 I assume that individuals in a political community are free and equal 
only if they recognize each other as free and equal. And, given that being 
subject to a law is only compatible with autonomy if openly and frankly 
acknowledged, under everybody else’s eyes, individuals can only recog-
nize each other as free and equal, when subject to a set of laws, if these 
laws are common knowledge among them. 36 
 Th us, in a community of free and equal people under law it is out in 
the open what the laws they are subject to are. (Th is can be accom-
plished, as we have seen— section  7 —through a Gricean structure of 
interrelated intentions extended to encompass common knowledge of 
the laws among addressees.) Free and equal people can only be subject 
to forms of power that satisfy this condition, and this is the kind of 
power that the Enlightenment project distinctively supports. 
 Let us now take stock. Publicity (common knowledge) is a necessary 
condition if the law is to respect the autonomy of its subjects ( section  6 ). 
It is an essential element in ERoL, accounting for the way in which laws 
meeting the ERoL ideal show respect for their subjects as adult human 
beings ( section  7 ). And it stands out as a prominent desideratum when 
the RoL (specifi cally, ERoL) ideal is seen, as it is in this section, as part 
of the Enlightenment project. Th e RoL (ERoL) is essentially a form of 
 public power, whose operations are commonly known among its sub-
jects, as contrasted with forms of power that operate ‘behind the back’ 
of individuals (by manipulating, unknown to them, their environment, 
preferences, or beliefs). And, for this reason, it is a mode of power which 
fi ts the dignity of adult, responsible, autonomous agents. 37 
 36 If publicity is understood as common knowledge, the RoL condition of publicity corre-
sponds to Rawls’s “fi rst level” of publicity concerning the acceptance of the principles of justice 
in a well-ordered society ( cf. Rawls  1999 , 292–3, 324). (Th e assumption that in a well-ordered 
society principles of justice should be public in this sense is there already in  A Th eory of Justice , 
 Rawls  1971 , e.g. at 48–9;  cf. Larmore  2003 , 369–75.) Further, when seen in the light of the 
Enlightenment project, the requirement of publicity (common knowledge) sets the stage, or 
prepares the ground, for what  Rawls ( 1999 , 293, 324) calls “full publicity”—a much more 
exigent condition, concerning the shared  justifi cation of the relevant standards. 
 37 Th is is why ERoL is germane to a critique of power: an anatomy, and exposure, of the 
mechanisms distinctive of forms of power not compatible with the autonomy of subjects. Th e 
import of the publicity condition in this regard is shown in the fact that some of these mecha-
nisms are refuted—both made ineff ective, and shown to be disreputable—by their being laid 
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 9. Publicity for Officials? 
 But, it will be objected, all this is too naive. In modern states, citizens do 
not know much of the law, let alone its complexities and intricacies. 
And it is extremely unrealistic to think that it could be otherwise. Th e 
division of labour applies to the legal domain, too. Detailed knowledge 
of the law is the lot of a specialized profession. How could it ever be 
otherwise? 
 Th is pessimism is refl ected in contemporary jurisprudence. As noted 
by J.  Waldron ( 2009 , 692), rules of recognition are typically thought of, 
following Hart, as stating the criteria  offi  cials are supposed to avail them-
selves of in identifying valid legal norms. Th e identifi cation of the law is 
a task that, it is assumed, belongs primarily if not exclusively to offi  cials 
and to professional lawyers. At the limit, perhaps, a legal system could 
exist where only offi  cials have cognizance of the law. 38 
 Moreover, if we follow the lines of Hart’s (1961, 89–95) conceptual 
genesis of developed legal systems, the views about publicity laid out in 
the previous sections look less plausible still. It is precisely in a (hypo-
thetical) ‘primitive’, pre-legal society—a closely-knit community whose 
members share a  Weltanschauung , ruled by a regime of social rules of 
obligation only—that individuals all know, with confi dence and in 
some detail, what the existing rules are, and what they require. (And, 
we may add, only in such a society do individuals also know that the 
others know . . . what the rules are.) It is precisely where, as a conse-
quence of social development and of changing circumstances, uncer-
tainties as to what are the rules of the group arise and become endemic 
that secondary rules are needed, and a legal system comes into being. 
Publicity, as here understood, is it seems distinctive of a  pre-legal com-
munity. By defi nition, where law exists, knowledge of it is the more or 
out in the open, and made explicit. Th ink, for example, of religious indoctrination, when 
prompted by the unstated assumption that widespread religious belief, no matter whether true 
or false, is necessary for the maintenance of a stable social order. 
 38 Publicity for offi  cials only may lead to non-standard forms of guidance of citizens’ behav-
iour ( cf. Kramer  1999 , 45–6;  Kutz  2009 , 210). Th ere may be sound ethico-political reasons 
favouring “selective transmission” of some legal standards (specifi cally, some criminal law deci-
sion rules) to offi  cials only, keeping citizens unaware of their existence (“acoustic separation,” 
 Dan-Cohen  1984 ). It is debatable (to say the least) whether, as  Dan-Cohen argues ( 1984 , 
667–73; cf. also  Kutz  2009 , 210), this is compatible with the RoL. Be that as it may, as I 
remarked ( n.  5 ) the RoL should not be taken as an ideal that always, under any circumstances, 
overrides all other relevant ethico-political considerations. 
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less exclusive possession of a restricted class (offi  cials, professional law-
yers) employing special, technical tools (rules of recognition) in order 
to fi nd out what it is. 39 
 It would be foolish to deny the main claims upon which the objection 
rests. True, one could reply that the ideal of publicity, as here under-
stood, is precisely that: an ideal. An ideal’s realization need not be an 
easy matter. But an ideal must be such that its realization has at least a 
minimum of plausibility. Rather, replying to the objection calls, I think, 
for a revision, and weakening, of our understanding of the ideal of pub-
licity. Th e needed revision is not dramatic. Law, in contrast to a regime 
of customary rules of obligation, is characterized by rules that make pos-
sible deliberate changes of existing rules—i.e. the deliberate modifi ca-
tion or destruction of previously existing rules, and the deliberate 
creation of new ones. Hart calls such secondary rules “rules of change”; 
where such rules exist, the rule of recognition of the system will neces-
sarily refer to them (1961, 93). Only in following these rules can people 
make (or change) positive laws ( section  4 ). We should modify our claim 
to hold that publicity requires that  these rules —i.e. the procedures for 
making positive law—be, at least in their rough outlines, common 
knowledge among the citizens, that an offi  cial, reliable, public record of 
the outcomes of the activities they defi ne (i.e. legislation) should be 
available and that the existence of a device for publication of the laws 
itself be common knowledge among the citizens. 
 39  Cf. Waldron  1999b , 13–14. So far, I have been talking of publicity as a matter of the laws 
being (commonly) known  by their addressees . But who are the addressees of the laws? Offi  cials, 
or the citizenry at large? Considerations along the lines set out in the text may lead to an option 
for the former hypothesis. More generally, many legal theorists (notably Kelsen) have held, for 
various reasons, that what legal norms purport directly to guide is the behaviour of offi  cials 
only. Such views press us further away from the understanding of the ideal of publicity I have 
been defending—indeed, in the opposite direction. True, we might content ourselves with the 
claim that what the RoL requires is that laws, understood as directives addressed to offi  cials, 
should be common knowledge among the latter, Th is would be a way of meeting—in fact, of 
eluding—the objection discussed in the text. A mistaken way, however. It is true that, if rules 
of recognition are to be understood, along the lines of Hart’s  Postscript (1994), as conventions 
of offi  cial behaviour (which is by no means devoid of problems;  cf. Green  1996 , 1695–7; 
 Celano  2003 ;  Dickson  2007 ), then it might perhaps follow, by defi nition, that they are com-
mon knowledge among offi  cials (it all depends on how the concept of convention is moulded). 
But this has little to do with the ideal of the RoL, as usually understood. Th e RoL—and,  a 
fortiori , ERoL—is a set of ethico-political requirements concerning basically the law in its 
relationship to ordinary people. 
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 Prescribing is a procedure publicly directed at the issuing of public 
directives: both the created norms and their mode of birth are out in the 
open ( section  7 ). Th is—plus an offi  cial, accessible, public record of the 
prescriptions issued—is what the publicity of legislation consists in. 40 It 
is true that laws cannot literally be  made known ( section  3 ) each one of 
them to each one of their addressees; nor can they, one by one, in detail, 
literally become common knowledge among them. But by such means 
they can become  ascertainable by those whose conduct they purport to 
rule—with the aid, no doubt, of professional lawyers. 41 
 Is this enough? It still remains true that few citizens know even a few 
statutes; they are not assiduous readers of offi  cial records of legislative 
proceedings ( Guastini  2010 , 83). Where ERoL, and the Enlightenment 
project generally, have gained some footing, however, records of the rel-
evant legal material are there and available to everybody. Rough knowl-
edge of the ways in which laws are created and applied is a matter of 
basic civic education . And legal education is, in principle, open to all, 
on an equal footing; you do not have to prove allegiance to a church or 
party, nor special personal qualities or family descendance, in order to 
have access to it. In principle, anybody can acquire it. 
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